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This note features an economy with search and matching frictions,
volatile opportunity cost of employment and demand-determined out-
put. I show that the model can generate big responses of unemploy-
ment to productivity movements. The key insight behind this result is
that strongly countercyclical markups amplify the impact of aggregate
shocks on the fundamental surplus, and as a consequence, on labour
market outcomes. This answers the critique of Chodorow-Reich and
Karabarbounis (2016), that the cyclicality of the opportunity cost
poses a challenge to the solution of the unemployment volatility puz-
zle.
Keywords: Demand-determined output, unemployment volatil-
ity, opportunity cost of employment, price markups, fundamental sur-
plus
JEL classification: E24, E32, J24, J41, J63
1 Introduction
Understanding labor market fluctuations is an important issue in economics.
The work of Shimer (2005) argued that for common calibrations of the stan-
dard matching model, the elasticity of market tightness is too low to explain
business cycle fluctuations (the unemployment volatility puzzle). Follow-
ing Shimer’s contribution, various modifications to the standard model have
∗I would like to thank Chris Martin and Paulo Santos Monteiro for helpful comments.
†University of Bath, n.kokonas@bath.ac.uk.
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been proposed to resolve the puzzle—notable contributions include Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008), Hall and Milgrom (2008), Pissarides (2009). However,
Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) showed that the opportunity cost
of employment is pro-cyclical, and that this cyclicality poses challenges to
models relying on constant opportunity cost to solve the puzzle.
The contribution of this note is to show that big responses of unem-
ployment to productivity changes are possible even with strongly procyclical
opportunity cost. I show that the fundamental surplus1 is inversely related
to price markups, and that strongly countercyclical markups amplify the im-
pact of aggregate shocks on the fundamental surplus, and as a consequence,
on labour market outcomes.
The economy features search and matching frictions in the labor mar-
ket and a two-sector firm structure. Specifically, workers search for jobs;
wholesale firms open costly vacancies to hire workers in order to produce
intermediate output; and monopolistically competitive retail firms produce
final goods with intermediate output, facing sticky prices. Wages are de-
termined via Nash bargaining. The standard matching model with volatile
opportunity cost obtains when prices are flexible and monopolistic distortions
are absent.
Productivity changes have a direct effect on wholesalers technology and
induce (indirectly) changes in the aggregate demand for final goods. Aggre-
gate demand externalities spill-over to hiring decisions through changes in
the relative price of intermediate output (real marginal cost of retailers). The
relative price channel induces a substantial adjustment of hirings in response
to productivity changes, even though the cyclical adjustment of wages, due
to the volatility of the opportunity cost, absorbs part of the response in
productivity.
The intuition of the mechanism involves the notion of the fundamental
surplus (FS). The FS denotes the total resources devoted to vacancy creation,
which is equal to the relative price of intermediate output times productivity
(value of an additional worker for wholesalers) less the opportunity cost of
employment. Under the flexible prices benchmark, relative prices are con-
stant and the response of the FS to productivity is muted. In contrast, under
demand-determined output, the relative price of intermediate output is pro-
cyclical, which amplifies the response of the FS to productivity changes, and
can generates big responses of unemployment to productivity, even when the
opportunity cost is procyclical.
The relative price of intermediate output can be mapped to the markup
1See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) for a characterisation of the fundamental surplus
in a variety of search and matching models.
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of the price over marginal cost of retailers. The latter is equal to the inverse
of the relative price of intermediate output, so that procyclicality of rela-
tive prices is equivalent to countercyclicality of the retailer’s price markup.
Productivity shocks affect the decision of retailers only indirectly, via their
effect on aggregate demand and real marginal cost, so that they act as de-
mand shocks. That is, higher productivity raises aggregate demand and real
marginal cost, causing the price markup to fall given that prices are sticky. In
that respect, the impact of productivity shocks on monopolist’s decisions in
my model is similar to the impact of demand shocks on monopolist’s decisions
in the standard New Keynesian model, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007) show
that the monopolist’s price markup is countercyclical following a monetary
policy or a government expenditure shock.2
My paper is not the first to study the effects of countercyclical price
markups on labour market outcomes. Rotemberg (2008) showed that coun-
tercyclical markups have a big impact on employment by weakening the
worker’s bargaining power and making wages less procyclical. Variations in
the monopolists’ market power can be a source of fluctuations and the op-
portunity cost of employment is constant. I depart from these assumptions.
Another paper investigating the importance of price markups in explain-
ing business cycle fluctuations is Bils et al. (2018). This paper decomposes
the “labour wedge” into product market and labour market distortions. Us-
ing US data, they measure that price markup movements are at least as
cyclical as wage markup movements. Thus, countercyclical price markups
should play a central role in explaining fluctuations alongside labour market
frictions. The predictions of my theoretical model is consistent with their re-
sults. Specifically, the cyclical behaviour of the FS is controlled by two forces.
On the one hand, countercyclical markups amplify the impact of shocks on
the FS, while on the other hand, procyclical opportunity cost dampens that
impact. In the absence of wage stickiness, the dampening force can be strong
and dominant, so it is not a priori obvious that an equilibrium model can
generate big responses of the FS to productivity changes. My contribution
is to build a model and show that such big responses are indeed possible.
The literature on DSGE models with labour marker frictions is exten-
sive (see a review of the literature in Blanchard and Gaĺı, 2010). My mod-
elling approach departs from the literature in three main directions. First,
I assume flexible wages (no wage stickiness). Second, I abstract from mone-
tary policy. Third, I compare the impact of productivity shocks on aggregate
2Also, strong countercyclicality of markups is an important feature of the heterogenous
agent New Keynesian framework of Kaplan et al. (2018), so that expansionary monetary
policy shocks shrink markups and cause profits to fall.
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outcomes between two economies in steady state, which differ insofar as ag-
gregate demand externalities are active and influence aggregate outcomes in
one economy but not the other.
The impact of productivity shocks on labour market outcomes is char-
acterised by the elasticity of market tightness to productivity. I decompose
it into two terms. The first is determined by common calibrations and has
limited influence on the elasticity, and the second is equal to the elasticity of
the FS to productivity. I conduct a quantitative experiment where I evaluate
these elasticities numerically for each economy.
Section 2 presents the environment; Section 3 presents the main argu-
ment; Section 4 presents a numerical example; Section 5 extends the analysis
to include variations in hours; Section 6 concludes. All derivations are dele-
gated into the online Appendix.
2 Environment
2.1 Agents and markets
Time is discrete and infinite (t = 0, 1, ...). The economy is populated by a
large household with a continuum of members of unit measure,3 and a two-
sector firm structure with a continuum of wholesale firms, j ∈ [0, 1], and
a continuum of retail firms, i ∈ [0, 1]. Market participants trade differenti-
ated consumption goods, i ∈ [0, 1], an intermediate good, labor and money.
Household members search for jobs in frictional labor markets. The whole-
sale sector is competitive, with firms opening costly vacancies to hire workers
in order to produce intermediate output; while the retail sector is monop-
olistically competitive, with firms buying intermediate output to produce
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ptct +mt = wtnt +mt−1 + πt − ptTt,
nt = (1− s)nt−1 + utf(θt),
(1)
where β ∈ (0, 1), ζ, δ > 0 are preference parameters. The household derives
utility from consumption, c, end-of-period real money balances, m/p,4 and
3I employ the “large” family assumption of Merz (1995).
4Although I model money by assuming agents derive utility from holding money bal-
ances, this is only a convenient “short-cut” to construct a stationary equilibrium, where
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experiences disutility by supplying labor, n, where ψ (·) is convex and differ-
entiable. Its wealth consists of nominal profits, π, real lump-sum taxes, T ,
previous period money balances and labor income; at t = 0, the household is
endowed with money balances m̄ > 0 and the growth rate of money is zero.
The price (index) is denoted by p and the wage by w. Total employment is
equal to pre-existing jobs, nt−1, net of separations, with s ∈ (0, 1) the sepa-
ration rate, plus new matches, with ut = 1− (1− s)nt−1 beginning-of-period
unemployment, and f (θ) ∈ (0, 1) the job-finding rate. As in Blanchard
and Gaĺı (2010) and Michaillat (2012), I assume that new matches become
immediately productive.







, with ε > 1, while the price index and the demand of each
differentiated good, resulting from minimising consumption expenditure, are






and c(i) = (p(i)/p)−ε c, respectively, with p(i)
denoting the price of each differentiated good.














− zt + β∆t+1,t(1− s)(1− f (θt+1))SHt+1, (3)
where ∆t+1,t ≡ (ct+1/ct)−ζ and zt = cζtψ′(nt) is the opportunity cost of em-
ployment in terms of consumption. Condition (2) states that along an opti-
mal path, the utility cost of holding $1.00 at tmust be equal to the utility gain
from holding that dollar for a period and converting it back into consumption
at t+ 1. Condition (3) states that along an optimal path, the marginal value
to the household of an additional worker at t in terms of consumption, SHt ,
is equal to the flow value plus the present discounted marginal value at t+ 1.
The flow value consists of the flow gain from wages and a flow loss associated
with moving an individual from unemployment to employment.
All wholesalers are identical and produce the intermediate good according
to the technology yW = an, where a is productivity. They post vacancies
to hire new employees and lose employees at the rate s. The cost of each
additional vacancy is equal to pγ, with γ > 0 denoting recruitment costs.
labour market frictions and aggregate demand externalities jointly influence aggregate
outcomes (see Section 2.3 for details).
5By restricting attention to steady states, where all variables are constant and bounded,
the transversality condition with respect to real money balances is satisfied. To simplify
exposition, I omit it from the analysis.
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Since job postings are homogenous to final goods, each wholesaler j buys final









, with v(j) denoting the number of vacancies
posted by wholesaler j. The demand by wholesalers for final goods produced
by retail firm i is v(j, i) = (p(i)/p)−ε v(j). Vacancies are filled at the rate
q(θ) ∈ (0, 1), which denotes the vacancy-filling rate, so that new hirings of
each wholesaler j are h(j) = q(θ)v(j). In the sequel, I will work with hirings
rather than vacancies. The number of workers available for production in
wholesale firm j are nt(j) = (1 − s)nt−1(j) + ht(j). At the aggregate level,
workers available for production at t equal nt = (1− s)nt−1 + ht, with nt =∫ 1
0




Wholesale firms sell their output to retailers in a competitive market at















nt+κ(j) = (1− s)nt+κ−1(j) + ht+κ(j), κ = 0, 1, ...
yWt+κ(j) = at+κnt+κ(j), κ = 0, 1, ....
(4)













Condition (5) states that along an optimal path, the marginal cost of hiring
an extra employee is equal to the flow value plus the present discounted
value of the marginal cost at t + 1. The flow value consists of the marginal
benefit of an additional worker, (pW/p)a, and the flow loss associated with
the wage cost of an additional worker. I assume that there is free entry
in the vacancy creation process so that the marginal value to the wholesale
firm of an additional employee, SW , is equal to the marginal cost, that is,
SWt = γ/q(θt). In other words, any current worker can be immediately
replaced with someone who is unemployed by paying the hiring cost.
Retail firms are monopolistically competitive and transform one-to-one
the intermediate good into differentiated (final) goods, yt(i) = xt(i), where
x(i) is the quantity of the intermediate good demanded by retailer i. I
distinguish between two regimes with respect to retailer decisions. In the
first regime, retail firms can set prices freely (flexible prices) and this regime
will serve as a benchmark; while in the second regime, I assume that retailers
have preset nominal prices that are equal to each other and that never change,
pt(i) = p for all t. This implies that the final good price is also constant,
pt = p for all t.
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Each retailer is constrained by an isoelastic demand for its good i, y(i) =
(p(i)/p)−ε ỹ, where ỹ denotes the aggregate demand for final goods. Also, τ(i)




τt(i)yt(i)di. I introduce subsidies in order to eliminate monopolistic
distortions so that the benchmark case corresponds to the standard matching
model (but with new matches being immediately productive). Specifically,
τ(i) = 1/ε for all i ∈ [0, 1], so that the optimality conditions of (6) imply
p(i)/p = pW/p (zero price markups).
Set against the previous benchmark, the second regime requires that re-





















where p(i)/p is the retailer’s fixed relative price, which is equal to unity
by symmetry. The retailer chooses how much to produce subject to the
constraint that its output cannot exceed the demand of its goods. I continue
assuming that τ(i) = 1/ε,6 and analyse equilibria where retailers always
accommodate aggregate demand. Under this regime, the retailer’s output is
determined by aggregate demand ỹ.
Matches are produced by a constant returns to scale matching technology,
h (u, v) , where u are job searchers and v =
∫ 1
0
v(j)dj are aggregate vacancies.
Also, h (u, v) ≤ min (u, v), f (θ) ≡ h (u, v) /u, q (θ) ≡ h (u, v) /v, θ ≡ v/u,
and f(θ) = θq(θ).
Wages are determined via Nash bargaining, where ω ∈ (0, 1) is the
worker’s bargaining power and the Nash solution requires
(1− ω)SHt = ωSWt . (8)
6 The results do not rely on this assumption whatsoever; it is only made to simplify
the presentation - see Appendix for more details.
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2.2 Steady state equilibria
A benchmark equilibrium is a path of prices, {pt(i), pt, pWt , wt}, and allo-
cations, {ct, ct(i),mt, nt, yWt (j), ht(j), vt(j, i), vt(j), nt(j), yt(i), θt, ut, ỹt}, such
that (i) households minimise consumption expenditure and solve (1), (ii)
wholesalers minimise vacancies expenditure and solve (4), (iii) retailers solve
(6), (iv) Nash solution is satisfied, and (v) all markets clear. A demand-
determined equilibrium is similarly defined but final goods prices are preset
for all t, which implies that retailers solve (7) instead of (6). I restrict at-
tention to symmetric steady state (SS) equilibria. Symmetry requires that
within each group of wholesalers and retailers, actions are identical to each
other, so that labels i, j are dropped. (See online appendix A for details.)
Consider the benchmark case. Combining (3),(5),(8), SF = γ/q(θ) and
imposing the SS assumption, yields
pW
p









The LHS of (9) is the FS, (pW/p)a− z, which is equal to the total resources
devoted to vacancy creation. Retailer’s optimality under symmetry requires
pW/p = 1. Hence, the FS is equal to productivity less the worker’s value of
leisure in terms of consumption, because the invisible hand cannot allocate
that value to vacancy creation. Market tightness is determined from (9).
Intermediate good’s market clearing requires an = yW = x = y. The ag-
gregate demand for final goods consists of household’s aggregate consumption
demand, c, and wholesaler’s aggregate demand for final goods, (γ/q(θ))h,
expressed in terms of hiring costs, so that ỹ ≡ c + (γ/q(θ))h. Retailers
accommodate demand, ỹ = y, which reduces to
c (m̄/p) = an (θ)− γ
q(θ)
h (θ) . (10)
The LHS expresses consumption as function of real balances by imposing SS
in (2) and substituting money market clearing, m = m̄ (zero money growth).
The RHS is output net of hiring costs as function of tightness. The final goods
price level is determined from (10). Finally, a benchmark equilibrium that
is useful below, requires that the solution of (9) maximises the RHS of (10)
(output net of hiring costs). The latter is strictly concave in tightness (labor
demand and hiring costs are increasing in tightness), so that the household’s
consumption demand attains its maximum value.7
7See Michaillat and Saez (2015) for a search and matching model where maximum
consumption is equivalent to the constrained-optimum. In my model, this is not true
since the planner would have to trade-off utility from consumption with disutility from
employment.
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Moving to the case of demand-determined output, final good prices, p,
are preset and price markups are positive. Expressions (9),(10) allow me
to solve for tightness and the price of the intermediate good. Equivalently,
I can express (9) in terms of the retailer’s price markup, and solve for a
demand-determined equilibrium as a pair of tightness and price markups,
without any reference to relative prices. Denote the price markup byM. In





Substituting (11) into (9), yields
1
(1− ε−1)M












and combining (10), (12), we solve for tightness and price markup.
In the remainder of the paper, I use the relative price formulation of
demand-determined equilibria.
2.3 Discussion of the assumptions
I discuss the assumption of the money in the utility function and the two-
sector firm structure modelling approach that I follow.
The presence of money in the utility function is necessary to obtain an
interesting concept of aggregate demand in a stationary environment, other-
wise households would spend all their income on the produced good (Say’s
law). Models with money in the utility function and aggregate demand exter-
nalities include Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Michaillat and Saez (2015),
among others.
The modelling approach of the wholesaler’s decisions is borrowed from
Ravenna and Walsh (2008). The split between hiring decisions and final good
production simplifies the wage determination to the (canonical) solution (8);
otherwise, with monopolistically competitive firms, I would have to consider
intra-firm bargaining solution concepts.
The modelling approach of the retailer’s decisions is borrowed from Ko-
rinek and Simsek (2016).9 This approach was chosen for its tractability.
8I assume that τ(i) = ε−1 holds true under preset prices, and that is why the price
markup depends on ε−1. See footnote 6 for explanation.
9Other models with fix prices and aggregate demand externalities include Benassy
(1975) and Malinvaud (1977).
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In particular, the preset prices assumption allows me to provide a clean
characterisation of the spill-over of aggregate demand externalities into hir-
ing decisions, captured by the cyclicality of relative prices (inverse of price
markups). In turn, these spill-over effects make hirings more sensitive to
productivity changes, and amplify the response of unemployment to produc-
tivity changes. (As I show in Appendix A.2, once I compute a benchmark
equilibrium with flexible prices, then it is straightforward to show existence
of a demand-determined equilibrium, under identical exogenous parameters,
and for preset prices close to the benchmark price level.)
3 Elasticities
This section characterises the elasticity of market tightness with respect to
productivity changes, εθ,a. Large values of εθ,a suffice to produce big re-
sponses of unemployment to productivity changes. The methodology I em-
ploy is as follows. I compute the deterministic steady state, where no shocks
are expected to happen, under each regime; and subsequently, I perform
comparative statics across steady states by varying productivity. Under the
benchmark regime, all prices respond to productivity, but relative prices are
constant and equal to unity, pW/p = 1. Under demand-determined output,

























The derivations of (13),(14) follow from differentiation of (9) with respect
to productivity. (See online appendix B for detailed derivations.)
Consider expression (13). The term Υ is determined by common calibra-
tions and has limited influence on the elasticity of market tightness; while
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the second term denotes the elasticity of the FS with respect to productivity
changes, εFS,a, which controls the magnitude of the elasticity of market tight-
ness to productivity changes. The standard matching model obtains when
εz,a = 0, where low values of the FS generate large values of εθ,a (Ljungqvist
and Sargent, 2017). The Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis critique is
that when εz,a > 0, the standard model model cannot generate “enough”
unemployment volatility. Suppose εz,a ≥ 1, then it follows from (13) that
εFS,a ≤ 1, which implies that εθ,a ≤ Υ.
In contrast, expression (14) decomposes the elasticity of the FS to pro-
ductivity changes into two terms. The first term depends on the elasticity
of the opportunity cost, while the second term depends on the elasticity of
relative prices to productivity changes. If the opportunity cost is strongly
procyclical, then the first term is small and has limited influence on the elas-
ticity of market tightness. However, if ε(pW /p),a > 0 and attains large values,
then it acts as a countervailing power to the procyclical movements of the
opportunity cost, and εθ,a can attain large values. Finally, when p
W/p = 1
and ε(pW /p),a = 0, (14) reduces to (13).
In the remainder of this section, I characterise the cyclicality and the
magnitude of ε(pW /p),a. To that end, I proceed in two steps. First, I restrict
attention to benchmark equilibria with strongly pro-cyclical opportunity cost.
A benchmark equilibrium with this property requires that the household’s
aggregate consumption is maximised (see the discussion in Section 2.2). Sec-
ond, there exists a demand-determined equilibrium with preset prices in the
neighbourhood of the benchmark equilibrium with maximum consumption
(Appendix A.2, case (i)). It is characterised by procyclical opportunity cost,
countercyclical markups (procyclical elasticity of relative prices) and attains
large values of εθ,a.
The model allows for equilibria where increases (decreases) in productiv-
ity generate a contraction (boom) in the labor market.10 This is consistent
with countercyclical opportunity cost, εz,a < 0. (Clearly, these equilibria
are not suitable for my purposes.) The mechanisms is as follows. Whole-
salers take advantage of increases in productivity to post fewer vacancies
and save on hirings costs, which causes market tightness to fall; the house-
hold places fewer members to employment so that the opportunity cost falls;
and retailer’s demand for inputs falls, reflecting the lower aggregate demand
for final goods, so that relative prices fall in order to clear the intermediate
good’s market. However, it turns out that there exist demand-determined
equilibria with pro-cyclical opportunity cost and pro-cyclical relative prices.
Specifically, wholesalers post more vacancies by incurring greater hiring costs
10The same property is true in some New Keynesian models (Gaĺı, 1999).
11
in order to benefit from improvements in productivity and increases in rela-
tive prices, which causes market tightness to increase; the household places
more members to employment so that the opportunity cost of employment
increases; and retailer’s demand for inputs increases, reflecting higher de-
mand for final goods, so that relative prices increase in order to clear the
intermediate good’s market.
Next, I show that εθ,a attains large values. Consider perturbations of
(10) with respect to productivity. Given preset prices, the LHS is zero while
the RHS is decomposed into the direct and indirect effect of productivity on
net output. The latter is equal to the product of the direct effect of tight-
ness on net output multiplied by the effect of productivity on tightness. By
definition, maximum consumption requires that the direct effect of tightness
on net output is zero, ∂c/∂θ = 0. In turn, the direct effect of tightness on
net output is small in any demand-determined equilibrium in the neighbour-
hood of the benchmark equilibrium with maximum consumption. Thus, to
restore equilibrium following a change in productivity requires large effects
of productivity on tightness. Simultaneously, (9) requires that large effects
of productivity on tightness translate to large effects on relative prices.
The intuition of the result is as follows. A fall in productivity induces a
large fall in hiring costs which, in turn, induces a large fall in the aggregate
demand for final goods, ỹ. Large falls in aggregate demand translates into
large falls in the demand for intermediate inputs, which, in turn, requires
large falls (increases) in relative prices (price markups) to clear the inter-
mediate good’s market. Aggregate demand externalities spill-over to hiring
decisions via lower relative prices. In turn, the marginal value of an addi-
tional worker falls more than the initial fall in productivity. Simultaneously,
wages fall, reflecting both the lower opportunity cost of households and the
lower value of an additional worker for the firm. However, lower wages can-
not “absorb” the fall in the marginal value of an additional worker. Thus,
hirings have to fall substantially. Compare this result with the mechanism
under the benchmark case. In that case, reductions in the marginal value of
an additional worker are absorbed almost entirely by reduction in wages, so
that the impact of productivity on labour market aggregates is small.
4 Numerical example
I compute a numerical example to illustrate the mechanism discussed in the
previous section. (Description of the calibration and solution method can be
found in Appendix C.)
As a benchmark against which to evaluate the numerical results, I use
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the estimate of Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) for the elasticity
of unemployment to productivity, εu,ā ≈ − 9.5 in the data.
I assume h(u, v) = κuαv1−α, with κ > 0, α ∈ (0, 1), and ψ(n) =
χn1+ξ/(1 + ξ), with χ > 0 and ξ > 0 the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. I fix δ = ζ = 1 (log-utilities) and normalise m̄ = a = 1.
Consider the benchmark equilibrium. Following Chodorow-Reich and
Karabarbounis (2016), I set β = 0.99, s = 0.045, α = 0.6; following common
calibrations in the business cycle literature, I set ξ = 1. Following Chodorow-
Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) again, I target three endogenous variables:
f ∗ = 0.704, q∗ = 0.71 and z∗ = 0.74; and, consistent with my analysis in
Section 3, I also target maximum aggregate consumption, ∂c/∂θ = 0.
The equilibrium value of the remaining endogenous variables are c∗ =
0.942, hiring costs := γh∗/q∗ = 0.0394, p∗ = 0.010615 and n(θ∗) = 0.981431.
The elasticity of tightness to productivity is the product of two terms: Υ
multiplied by the elasticity of FS to productivity. It follows that Υ = 1.11037,
εz,a = 1.0646, which imply εθ,a = 0.9066. The elasticity of unemployment to
productivity is εu,a = −(1 − u∗)(1 − α)εθ,a = −0.3402. The upshot is that
the elasticity of unemployment to productivity under the benchmark case
is almost 30 times lower than its empirical counterpart. The amplification
mechanism is very weak at best.
Consider a demand-determined equilibrium. The exogenous parameters
are unchanged and consistent with the benchmark equilibrium. A demand-
determined equilibrium is indexed by the preset price of final goods p, and
existence requires that p > p∗ and M > 1. I set p = 0.0107 > p∗, and an
equilibrium consistent with procyclical opportunity cost and countercyclical
markups produces M = 1.13. The elasticity of tightness to productivity is
equal to εθ,a = 49; the elasticity of unemployment to productivity is com-
puted using the previous formula and it is equal to εu,a = −18.7. The
demand-determined equilibrium produces strong amplification. Specifically,
it produces an unemployment elasticity that is twice as large as its empirical
counterpart. Finally, there exist pairs of benchmark and demand-determined
equilibria, where the former produces weak amplification while the latter pro-
duces values for εu,a that are close to its empirical counterpart.
5 Extension
I extend the analysis to include variation in hours per worker (intensive
margin). The disutility cost of the large family is χnt (e
1+φ
t /(1 + φ)), with
parameters χ, φ > 0, n denotes the extensive margin as before and e denotes
the hours per worker. The household takes e and w as given when it decides
13
how to allocate its budget between consumption, real balances and workers
to maximise utility. The worker and the wholesale firm bargain over wages
and hours, and as before, I assume Nash bargaining. (All derivation can be
found in Appendix D.)




εz,ā = 1 + ε(pW /p),ā,
with ā := a e.
Substituting these results into (13), (14), yields the following result.
Proposition 3. (Elasticities)
(i) (Benchmark)




1 + ε(pW /p),ā
}
. (16)
The above expressions are the simplified versions of those in Proposition
1. By inspection, it is evident that strongly countercyclical markups amplify
the impact of productivity on tightness.
6 Conclusions
This note shows that big responses of unemployment to productivity changes
are possible in an economy with demand-determined output, procyclical op-
portunity cost of employment and countercyclical price markups. The mag-
nitude of the elasticity of market tightness is controlled by the elasticity of
price markups to productivity changes. The upshot is that aggregate de-
mand externalities spill-over to hiring decisions via the real marginal cost of
retailers, amplifying the effects of productivity changes on hiring decisions.
This mechanism highlights the important role played by aggregate demand






The symmetric stationary equilibrium requires
Beveridge curve : n = f(θ)/ (s+ (1− s)f(θ)) , (A.1)
Aggregate demand : ỹ ≡ c+ γ
q(θ)
h, (A.2)
Goods market clearing : yW = an = x = y = ỹ, (A.3)
Aggregate hires : h = sn, (A.4)
Matching technology : h (u, v) ≤ min (u, v) , (A.5)
Job searchers : u = 1− (1− s)n, (A.6)




a− w̄ = γ
q(θ)
(1− β(1− s)) , (A.8)
Retailer’s optimality : pW = p, (A.9)
Wholesaler’s surplus : SF = γ/q(θ), (A.10)
Household’s surplus : SH =
w̄ − cζψ′(n)
1− β(1− s)(1− f(θ))
, (A.11)
Nash solution : ωSF = (1− ω)SH , (A.12)













l , l > 0. More-








l and f ′ (θ) = (q (θ))1+l.
Lemma 1. Suppose a > sγ. There exists a unique threshold θ∗, which
satisfies
f ′ (θ∗) = sγ (a− (1− s)c)−1 , (A.14)
and consumption attains the maximum level at θ∗.
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Proof. Differentiating (A.13) with respect to θ yields
∂c
∂θ
= (s+ (1− s)f)−1 (af ′ − sγ)− (s+ (1− s)f)−2 (af − sγθ) (1− s) f ′.
Rearranging and setting ∂c/∂θ = 0, I obtain (A.14). Furthermore, con-
sumption becomes negative when tightness is above the threshold θ̂, which




= sγ/a < 1, that implies c = 0.
Consider (A.14). At θ = 0, f ′ (0) = 1 and LHS > RHS; while at θ = θ̂,









, it follows from the intermediate value theorem that a
solution exists. Furthermore, it is unique because the RHS of (A.13) is the
sum of strictly concave functions, and hence, it is strictly concave.
The previous discussion is summarised in Figure 1, which shows the graph

























Market tightness is determined by (A.15); subsequently, combining (A.1)-
(A.13), I compute all remaining endogenous variables.
I compute equilibria with the following argument. Consider prices that
support equilibria with market tightness belonging to the feasible set θ ∈(
0, θ̂
)
. In other words, fix the tightness level at the previous interval, and
then combine (A.7), (A.13) to solve for prices that clear the good’s market.
Subsequently, I set the bargaining parameter ω ∈ (0, 1) to satisfy (A.15).
Without loss of generality, suppose ψ(n) = χn1+ξ/(1 + ξ), with χ, ξ > 0.
As ω → 1, the RHS becomes unboundedly large, so that RHS > LHS. To
complete the argument, I show that as ω → 0, then RHS < LHS. At ω = 0,
the latter inequality requires








From (A.13), it follows that a > sγ/q(θ), which is equivalent to c > 0.
Furthermore, common calibrations require β ≈ 1, which imply that β + (1−
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Figure 1: Graph of A.13
β)/s ≈ 1; and finally, the fundamental surplus can be made arbitrarily close
to its upper bound, a, by setting low values of the disutility parameter χ.
Hence, (A.16) is satisfied.
The previous argument placed restrictions on β, χ, ω and the relative
value of productivity with respect to frictional parameters. The analysis is
consistent with frictional and (the other) preference parameters being set
according to common calibrations in the literature.
A.2 Demand-determined output
The demand-determined output equilibrium satisfies (A.1)-(A.12), except
(A.9). I continue to assume that τ = ε−1, which I explain carefully below.
Existence of a demand-determined equilibrium requires M > 1.
Combining (A.1)-(A.4) and (A.7), yields
















which determines tightness at given p. Furthermore, pW adjusts to clear the
inputs market. In particular, expression (A.15) reduces to
pW
p









Relative prices are different from unity, pW/p 6= 1, and importantly, they
respond to changes in productivity.
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The characterisation of the demand-determined output equilibrium re-
quires to specify a benchmark equilibrium. I consider all cases of benchmark
equilibria: (i) θ = θ∗; (ii) 0 < θ < θ∗; and (iii) θ∗ < θ < θ̂.
Case (i). Suppose (p∗, c∗) denote the price level that supports maximum
consumption. A demand-determined equilibrium requires p > p∗, so that real
balances and consumption are lower relative to the flexible price equilibrium.
At p, there exists two equilibria: θ < θ∗ and θ > θ∗ (see points A and B of
Figure 1). In the rest of the analysis, I focus on demand-determined equilibria
with θ > θ∗. (In Section B.2, I show that these equilibria are characterised by
pro-cyclical opportunity cost, while equilibria where θ < θ∗ are characterised
by counter-cyclical opportunity cost.) Juxtaposing (A.15), where θ = θ∗,
and (A.18), where θ > θ∗, implies that relatives prices satisfy pW/p > 1.
A demand-determined equilibrium close to θ∗ satisfies pW/p < (1− ε−1)−1,
since relatives price are close to unity and the demand constraint is binding.
Case (ii). Suppose the benchmark equilibrium is at point A of Figure 1.
Prices can be fixed above or below the flexible price level (draw a parallel ray
above or below point A; the allocation of the demand-determined equilibrium
is located above or below point B). As before, a demand-determined equi-
librium with θ > θ∗ requires pW/p > 1 and the demand constraint binds as
long as pW/p < (1− ε−1)−1. However, benchmark and demand-determined
equilibria are far away in terms of allocations, so that the latter inequality is
not trivially satisfied. A sufficient condition for its satisfaction is to “shrink”
the allocation distance between point A and points in the neighbourhood of
B. This requires productivity to be close to sγ, so that θ̂ becomes small (see
Lemma 1 and the proof therein). Hence, relative prices can be close to unity
and the demand constraint binds.
Existence of the demand-determined equilibria relied on the assumption
τ = ε−1. To see this, if τ = 0 whenever output is demand-determined, then
binding demand constraints require pW/p < 1, and the previous argument
collapses. However, equilibria under case (iii) exist even if τ = 0.
Case (iii). Suppose the benchmark equilibrium is at point B of Figure 1.
Fix prices below the benchmark price level, so that real balances and con-
sumption are higher relative to the benchmark equilibrium, but importantly,
market tightness is below the benchmark level. The fall in hiring costs re-
duces aggregate demand relative to the benchmark level. Juxtaposing (A.15)
and (A.18) imply pW/p < 1. In turn, the demand constraint binds (this is
true even if τ = 0). As prices tend to the benchmark price level, allocations




Combining (A.8) with (A.10)-(A.12), yields
w̄ = z + ω (a− z + θγβ(1− s)) . (B.1)
Substituting (B.1) into (A.8) and rearranging, yields
(1− ω)
γ
(a− z) = ωθβ(1− s) + 1
q(θ)
(1− β(1− s)) . (B.2)






























with εψ′,n = ψ





εz,a = ζ (εc,a + εc,θεθ,a) + εψ′,nεn,θεθ,a. (B.4)
Expression (B.4) is the elasticity of the opportunity cost with respect to
productivity. The first term denotes the total effect of productivity changes
on consumption, while the second term denotes the effect of productivity
changes on the disutility cost. In particular, the effect of productivity on
consumption is decomposed into the direct and the indirect effect; moreover,
the inverse of the elasticity of substitution is usually calibrated to ζ = 1 (log-
utilities) or ζ = 2. The direct effect is computed by differentiating the RHS
of (A.13) with respect to a, and εc,a > 1. In contrast, the sign of the indirect
effect—assuming that we focus on equilibria that satisfy εθ,a > 0—depends
on εc,θ, which is positive (negative) when tightness is below (above) θ
∗, and
zero at θ∗. The second term is always positive since εn,θ > 0 (see A.1).
Benchmark equilibria under cases (i) or (ii), are characterised by strongly
pro-cyclical opportunity cost, εz,a > 1, since εc,θ ≥ 0; while under case (iii),
εc,θ < 0, and to demonstrate strong pro-cyclicality requires the following
argument. As θ → θ∗, then εc,θ → 0, and in the neighbourhood to the right
of θ∗ (see Figure 1), the opportunity cost is strongly pro-cyclical. Moreover,
as a increases relative to sγ, then θ̂ increases, and the graph around θ∗ flattens
out. Hence, the neighbourhood to the right of θ∗, where the opportunity cost
is strongly pro-cyclical, expands.
The response of the fundamental surplus (FS), a− x, to changes in pro-
ductivity is muted when the opportunity cost is strongly pro-cyclical. This
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implies that wholesaler’s hiring decisions are less responsive to productivity






which is less than unity as longs as εz,a > 1. Moreover, the product of the














af ′ − sγ − (s+ (1− s)f)−1 (af − sγθ) (1− s)f ′
}




θ (s+ (1− s)f)−1
× 1
sγ − f ′ [a− (1− s)c]
. (B.7)
In turn, the first term of the RHS reduces to
an
θ (s+ (1− s)f(θ))−1
=
af(θ) (s+ (1− s)f(θ))−1





The first equality uses (A.1) to substitute for labor demand n, and the second
equality uses the properties of the matching technology, namely, f(θ) =
θq(θ), to cancel out terms. Hence, (B.7) modifies to
εθ,a = aq(θ)×
1
sγ − f ′(θ) [a− (1− s)c]
. (B.8)
The first term of (B.8) is bound above by a; while the second is unbounded
and positive (negative) for θ > θ∗(θ < θ∗). As θ → θ∗, the denominator of the
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second term goes to zero (see A.14), and the model generates big responses
of unemployment to productivity changes. Moreover, (B.4) reduces to
εz,a = εψ′,nεn,θεθ,a, (B.9)
since consumption is determined by real money balances, m̄/p. The oppor-
tunity cost is strongly pro-cyclical when εθ,a is positive and large; while it is
counter-cyclical when εθ,a is negative.








Moreover, differentiating the RHS of (A.18) with respect to productivity
reduces to (B.6). Subsequently, combining (B.6), (B.10), the elasticity of




















As θ → θ∗, then the term inside the brackets is positive and large. As a
result, the response of relative prices to productivity is strongly pro-cyclical.
Equivalently, rearranging (B.11), I can express the elasticity of market
















which is the formula of Proposition 1. It is evident that strong responses
of market tightness to productivity changes, under pro-cyclical opportunity
cost, require strongly pro-cyclical relative prices.
Finally, as tightness increases above θ∗, εθ,a decreases and the opportunity
cost becomes less pro-cyclical (see B.8, B.9). Moreover, the opportunity
cost under the benchmark equilibrium (case iii) become less pro-cyclical,
since (the negative) εc,a increases in magnitude. As a result, it is possible
that the demand-determined model can produce less volatility relative to the
benchmark model. However, there is no clean analytical characterisation.
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C Numerical example
I assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function for the purposes of this section,
h(u, v) = κuαv1−α, with κ > 0, α ∈ (0, 1).11 Furthermore, I continue as-
suming ψ(n) = χn1+ξ/(1 + ξ), with ξ the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor
supply.
The exogenous parameters of the model are
Ξ =
{
ξ, α, ω, s, ζ, δ, m̄, β, γ, χ, κ, a, ε
}
.
Consider a benchmark equilibrium. Fix ζ = δ = 1 (log-utilities) and nor-
malise m̄ = a = 1. Following Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016),
I set β = 0.99, s = 0.045, α = 0.6; following common calibrations in the
business cycle literature, I set ξ = 1; and ε = 2.12 The rest of the param-
eters, {κ, ω, γ, χ} are set in order to target certain “endogenous” variables.
Specifically, following Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016), I target
f ∗ = 0.704, q∗ = 0.71 and z∗ = 0.74,13 and these targets imply θ∗ = 0.9915
and u∗ = 6% . The fourth target is maximum consumption, which requires
that (A.14) is satisfied, ∂c/∂θ = 0.
The numerical solution produces the following results. The numerical
value of parameters used to achieve the targets are κ = 0.7064, ω = 0.25,
γ = 0.633 and χ = 0.8. The value of endogenous variables are c∗ = 0.942,
hiring costs := γh∗/q∗ = 0.0394, p∗ = 0.010615 and n(θ∗) = 0.981431.
The elasticity of tightness to productivity is the product of two terms: Υ
multiplied by the elasticity of FS to productivity. It follows that Υ = 1.11037,
εz,a = 1.0646, which imply εθ,a = 0.9066. The elasticity of (beginning-of-
period) unemployment to productivity is εu,a = −(1 − u∗)(1 − α)εθ,a =
−0.3402.
Consider a demand-determined equilibrium. The parameters in the set
Ξ are unchanged, equal to the values assigned before. The equilibrium is
indexed by the preset price of final goods p, and existence of a demand-
determined equilibrium requires that p > p∗ and M > 1 (see Section A.2,
case (i)). I compute an equilibrium in a neighbourhood of the benchmark
equilibrium, that is, for preset prices p close to p∗.
The choice of ε = 2 is done only for presentational convenience - common
calibrations require ε = 6. Specifically, as ε increases and M falls, demand-
determined equilibria are “pushed” in an even closer neighbourhood of the
11This modification allows me to align my calibration strategy with relevant papers in
the literature; it is not crucial for the results.
12I explain the choice of ε = 2 when I discuss the demand-determined equilibrium. The
benchmark equilibrium is independent of ε.
13This value for the opportunity cost is one of the empirical estimates they obtain.
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benchmark equilibrium. All prices p are infinitesimally close to p∗ and nu-
merical evaluation is not possible since numbers are rounding to p∗. To avoid
this tedious numerical problem, I set a lower ε to expand the neighbourhood
of demand-determined equilibria and conduct a meaningful numerical exper-
iment. However, all qualitative results still hold for empirical relevant values
of ε = 6.
Suppose p = 0.0107 > p∗. Then, (A.17) is consistent with two solutions:
θ = 2.1263 or θ = 0.436606. I pick the highest solution which is consistent
with procyclical opportunity cost and countercyclical markups. Furthermore,
(A.18) implies M = 1.13. The elasticity of tightness to productivity is com-
puted by (B.8) and it is equal to εθ,a = 49; the elasticity of unemployment
to productivity is computed using the previous formula and it is equal to
εu,a = −18.7
D Extension
I introduce variation in the intensive margin as well. To simplify the analysis,
I assume that the cyclicality of the opportunity cost is driven by variations






with χ, φ > 0, n denotes the extensive margin (number of workers) and e
denotes the hours per work (intensive margin). Importantly, the household
takes e and w as given when it decides how to allocate its budget between
consumption, real balances and workers to maximise utility. The worker and
the wholesale firm bargain over wages and hours, and as before, I assume
Nash bargaining.
















c (m̄/p) = aen (θ)− γ
q(θ)
h (θ) , (D.4)





Expression (D.5) says that hours per employed are set to maximise the joint
surplus; and n(θ), h(θ) are consistent with (A.1) and (A.4).
Consider the benchmark equilibrium where pW/p = 1. Fix ā = ae. Then,
(D.3)-(D.5) reduce to









c (m̄/p) = ān (θ)− γ
q(θ)
h (θ) , (D.7)
(1 + φ)z = ā, (D.8)
and satisfaction of (D.6), (D.7) follows from the previous analysis. Subse-
quently, z and e are determined by (D.8) and (D.2) respectively.
Following a similar argument as before, the elasticity of market tightness




= Υ× ā− z × 1
ā− z
= Υ, (D.9)
where the second equality follows from perturbations of (D.8).
Next, consider a demand-determined equilibrium. (D.3)-(D.5) reduce to
pW
p









c (m̄/p) = ān (θ)− γ
q(θ)
h (θ) , (D.11)




and satisfaction of (D.10), (D.11) follows from the previous analysis; and, z
and e are determined by (D.12) and (D.2) respectively.

























1 + ε(pW /p),ā
}
,
where the second equality follows from perturbations of (D.12).
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Olivier Blanchard and Jordi Gaĺı. Labor markets and monetary policy: A
new keynesian model with unemployment. American economic journal:
macroeconomics, 2(2):1–30, 2010.
Olivier Jean Blanchard and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki. Monopolistic Competition
and the Effects of Aggregate Demand. American Economic Review, 77(4):
647–666, September 1987.
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich and Loukas Karabarbounis. The cyclicality of the
opportunity cost of employment. Journal of Political Economy, 124(6):
1563–1618, 2016.
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